Until then, the FAA will use AM1.2405 to capture those requirements for the Model M001 and ensure the powerplant installation level of safety is appropriate regardless of the aircraft level safety objectives. Multiple commenters requested the FAA consider modifying AM1.2425(b), “Powerplant Operational Characteristics,” to include wording from SC-VTOL.2425(b) that would only require inflight engine shutdown and restart capability if the safety benefits outweigh the hazards. Another commenter requested clarity on AM1.2425, which requires a means for shutdown and restart of the powerplant within an established operational envelope.

• The FAA included this phrase to limit the cases where handling qualities are evaluated to those conditions not shown to be extremely improbable to limit the applicant’s burden.
• Commenters requested the FAA clarify what is meant by the definition of a “life limited part” in proposed AM1.2713(a)(2), as it includes phrases that make it open-ended and indistinguishable from the definition of a critical part in proposed AM1.2713(a)(1).
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• Lastly, the FAA added a definition for the term “local events” in response to comments requesting clarification of this term as used in requirements in subparts H and I.
• Additionally, the FAA included AM1.2135(a)(7) to incorporate the steepest approach gradient within the approved flight envelope.

AM1.2725?Operation Demonstration

Commenters requested the FAA clarify “where the exposure to lightning is likely” in AM1.2430(a)(2), which they believe could be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation suggested by commenters is to consider “likely” as it applies to areas of the aircraft where lightning may strike, while another interpretation propeller accounting is in reference to operating environments where lightning is likely. The applicant will show compliance with AM1.2430(a)(2) for the Model M001 consistent with other type certificated products by identifying areas of the powered-lift where direct attachment of lightning is “likely,” and evaluating the resulting effects.

AM1.2733?Engine Electrical Systems

• The intended aircraft application must be taken into account to assure the assessment of the engine system safety is valid.
• (b) For aircraft approved for essential performance, the applicant must determine the takeoff performance to 50 feet above the takeoff surface such that a rejected takeoff resulting in safe stop or landing can be made at any point along the takeoff flight path following a critical change of thrust.
• (c) Electronic propeller-control-system embedded software must be designed and implemented by a method approved by the Administrator that is consistent with the criticality of the performed functions and that minimizes the existence of software errors.
• (b) The lubrication system must be designed to prevent contamination of the engine bearings and lubrication system components.
• The FAA concurs with the comments and modified proposed AM1.2300(b)(2) by replacing the specific trim indications with a requirement that the trim systems and functions provide information necessary for safe operation.

(b) The aircraft must exhibit suitable short period dynamic stability inclusive of likely failures. (7) The aircraft must be able to safely complete a landing using the steepest approach gradient procedures. (2) Transition to the balked landing condition and performance established in AM1.2120. (2) Temperatures above and below standard day temperature that are within the range of operating limitations, if those temperatures could have a negative effect on performance.

AM1.2731?Operation With a Variable-Pitch Propeller

The FAA developed these criteria because no existing standard captured the powered-lift’s various flight modes and electric engines and some unique characteristics of their propellers. The new requirements specific to the Archer Model M001 in the proposed airworthiness criteria used an “AM1.xxxx” section-numbering scheme. Several commenters requested the FAA elaborate on how the FAA differentiated between requirements for lift generating rotors compared to propellers, and whether icing ingestion requirements are needed for propellers. The FAA does not concur with suggestions to add additional requirements for lift generating rotors or ice ingestion requirements for the AM1.2800 series criteria.

§?23.2235?Structural Strength

AM1.2415 is similarly intended to capture any aircraft icing during an inadvertent encounter that adversely affects powerplant operation. Lastly, the FAA added a definition for the term “local events” in response to comments requesting clarification of this term as used in requirements in subparts H and I. (c) A defined service-management process that identifies the continued airworthiness requirements of the propeller critical https://www.bookstime.com/articles/reversing-entries part as required by the engineering process. (d) If reliance is placed on a safety system to prevent a failure progressing to hazardous propeller effects, the possibility of a safety system failure, in combination with a basic propeller failure, must be included in the analysis. Such a safety system may include safety devices, instrumentation, early warning devices, maintenance checks, and other similar equipment or procedures.

AM1.2715?Power Response

A35.4?Airworthiness Limitations Section